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1 Introduction
Several striking stylized facts on regional economic diﬀerences are related to the real estate
markets. First, even within the same country, tremendous diﬀerences in house prices are
observed across regions. For instance, Hwang and Quigley (2006) show that for a sample
of U.S. metropolitan areas (MSAs), during the period 1975-2000, the real prices of housing
in three California housing markets had more than tripled, while the real housing prices in
three other MSAs (Houston, Albany, and Oklahoma City) were stagnant. What accounts
for such cross-sectional diversity becomes an important research topic. The empirical works
of Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005a, b), Hwang and Quigley (2006), among others, suggest
that it is the local government regulation, such as “growth control” that limits the increase
of housing supply and leads to a higher housing price at the equilibrium. Wheaton and
Simonton (2007) find that “real construction costs have fallen slightly over the last 35 years,”
suggesting that house price increase is very unlikely to be driven by “cost-inflation.” Recently,
Saiz (2010) estimates the price elasticity of housing supply (henceforth, supply elasticity) and
finds that variations across diﬀerent metropolitan areas are very significant.1 For example,
the supply elasticities in both Miami and Los Angeles-Long Beach are estimated to be below
0.7, the counterpart in Las Vegas is close to 1.4, while the supply elasticities in Kansas City
and Oklahoma City are estimated to be well above 3.0. Saiz (2010) also finds that highly
regulated metropolitan areas typically have low estimates of supply elasticities.
Not only the dramatic diﬀerences in the level of house prices can be attributed to the dif-
ferences in the supply elasticities, the diﬀerences in the volatility of house prices may also be
1Green, Malpezzi and Mayo (2005) adopt a diﬀerent methodology in estimating the price elasticity of
housing supply. They also find that the variations across diﬀerent metropolitan areas are in fact very large.
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explained by the diﬀerences in the supply elasticities. To show the relation between volatil-
ity of real house price and supply elasticity, we construct semi-annual real house price by
dividing nominal housing price index from Case-Shiller (monthly data are averaged into semi-
annual data) by semi-annual city level CPI data from the BLS.2 We focus on semi-annual
data because city-level CPIs are not available on a consistent basis for higher frequency.
We choose the longest sample for which we can obtain the most data points, resulting in a
sample from 1991S1-2010S1 (S here denotes semi-annual), yielding 39 data points for each of
the 14 metropolitan areas we have data. The real house price is then logged and HP filtered
with a smoothing parameter of 400 before standard deviation is calculated. The estimates of
the supply elasticities are from Saiz (2010). Table 1 reports the data while Figure 1 provides
a scatter-plot of the data together with the OLS regression line (red line). The slope of the
regression line is −3.6,3 which is significant at 5%. It shows that metropolitan areas with
higher supply elasticities tend to have lower volatility of real house prices.
(Table 1 and Figure 1 about here)
The third stylized fact is that the monetary policy propagation mechanism varies across
regions. For instance, Carlino and Defina (1998, 1999, 2006), among others, find significant
heterogeneity in the income responses to monetary policy across diﬀerent regions or states.
In particular, they find (1) strong evidence that manufacturing-intensive states are more
responsive to changes in monetary policy shocks than the more industrially diverse states,
and (2) weaker evidence that states containing a relatively larger concentration of small
2The Case-Shiller index is available through http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-
home-price-indices/en/us/?indexId=spusa-cashpidﬀ—p-us–-. The Bureau of Labor Statistics data can be
found in http://www.bls.gov/.
3Note that removing Atlanta (the outlier in terms of supply elasticity) will only make the slope of the
regression line steeper.
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firms tend to be more responsive to monetary policy shifts than states composed of smaller
concentrations of small firms. They also conclude that the evidence for a broad credit
channel is weak. Fratantoni and Schuh (2003) construct a large VAR model in which the
regional economic variables (regional house price, regional output, etc.) have potentially
time-varying impact on the aggregate variables. The aggregate variables will then aﬀect
diﬀerent regional variables simultaneously through the change in the mortgage rate, among
other variables. They show that regional housing markets display heterogeneous responses
to monetary policy shocks.
The fourth stylized fact is related to the apparently spatial-dependent household portfo-
lio. For instance, Goetzmann, Massa and Simonov (2004) find that rural portfolios are more
diversified than urban portfolios in their Swedish dataset. Moreover, the portfolio diversi-
fication of the agents in their sample seems to be characterized by factors associated with
urban growth. Kohler and Smith (2005) find that in the Australian data, with a 100 person
per square kilometer increase in urbanization, the portfolio share of home will increase by
0.4 percentage points on average.
While there may be diﬀerent explanations for each of these stylized facts, this paper
attempts to study these facts in a unifying framework by extending a standard dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to a multi-regional setting. While the previous
literature focuses on the fiscal policy competition or coordination among regions,4 this paper
is devoted to study the regional housing markets and their interactions with the monetary
policy in a multi-regional setting.5 Amerit of DSGEmodel is that both the quantity variables
(such as consumption and investment) and price variables (such as non-durable goods price,
housing price and stock price) are all endogenously determined. All agents maximize their
objective functions in the model. Thus, it is easier to understand the transmission mechanism
4The literature is too large to be reviewed here. Among others, see the survey papers by Epple and
Nechyba (2004).
5To the best of our knowledge, it seems that this paper is the first paper which combines the nominal
rigidities and the regional consideration in a DSGE framework. Among others, see Leung (2004).
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of the monetary policy.
To highlight the role of the housing market in the aggregate economy as well as the
financial market, we assume that the two regions are ex-ante identical except that the housing
adjustment costs diﬀer across regions. Without loss of generality, the adjustment cost is
assumed to be lower in the region 1.6 The two regions will then be subject to region-specific
shocks. In this model as in practice, history dependent contingent claims are not available.
Fortunately, there is a national stock market which (1) “owns” the firms in both regions, and
(2) welcomes investment of agents from diﬀerent regions.7 The housing market, however, is
“regional.” In particular, we assume that the agents in each region can only purchase and
derive utility from the housing stock in the same region.8
For monetary policy to have any real eﬀects, we introduce nominal rigidity in the goods
market. Following Calvo (1983), the renewal of nominal price contracts are random (which
will be explained in more details later). To facilitate the comparison with the literature, the
government is restricted to follow the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). In words, it means that
the monetary authority will respond to the fluctuations of the inflation rate and the GDP.
Taylor (1993) and many subsequent writers find that the Taylor rule is a good (first-order)
approximation of the monetary policy that has been practiced.
To focus on the business cycle eﬀect, the regions in the model are assumed to have the
same (long run) economic growth rate, which is then normalized to zero. While it might
seem to be a strong assumption in the first glance, it may nevertheless be consistent with
6The diﬀerence in adjustment costs need not be due to physical or engineering reason, but due to political
economy reason. Among others, Ortalo-Magne and Prat (2007) build a political economy model in which the
equilibrium housing supply can be ineﬃciently low, as homeowners try to protect their interests. This paper
attempts to focus on the aggregate implications for such diﬀerence and will therefore take the diﬀerence as
given.
7In principle, as one referee wisely observes, since history-dependent contingent claims are not available,
the paths of the equilibrium price and quantities can be history dependent. In our numerical implementations,
since we focus on the moments over a sample period rather than the exact time paths, we do not observe
significant changes in results with diﬀerent initial conditions.
8While this assumption will preclude the fact that some people in the North own seasonal homes in the
South, say Florida, it seems that the assumption is very realistic for most of the population in the USA.
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some empirical research.9 To further simplify the analysis, we also assume that the agents
will not move across regions.10
Clearly, this paper builds on a large literature on monetary policy.11 This paper com-
plements the literature by explicitly considering diﬀerent regions in a DSGE model. This
enables us to diﬀerentiate the assets into two classes: national assets called “stock” and
“bonds,” and a regional one called “housing.” Thus, this paper also introduces a “regional
aspect” into the standard general equilibrium asset pricing literature, such as Jermann (1998,
2002, 2006). As it will become clear, the behavior of the national housing price (index) can
behave very diﬀerently from the regional counterpart. An important implication, which we
will discuss further, is that the optimal portfolio of agents from diﬀerent regions can be very
diﬀerent.
After the first draft of this paper has been presented in conferences, we become aware of
Ortalo-Magne and Prat (2007). They intend to provide a micro-foundation for the diﬀerence
in the supply elasticity based on a political economy model. This paper instead attempts
to relate stylized facts concerning the city-level house prices to the corresponding supply
elasticities. In particular, this paper shows that the diﬀerence in the supply elasticity does
not only contribute to the diﬀerences in the levels and volatilities of the house prices, it can
also lead to diﬀerence in the agents portfolio as well as diﬀerence in the monetary policy
propagation mechanism across regions. Thus, the two papers have very diﬀerent focuses and
should be viewed as complementary to each other.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section presents the model. Section
9For instance, after reviewing a large empirical literature on the regional convergence, Evans (2000)
concludes that “the per capita incomes of the contiguous U.S. states show a pronounced tendency to converge
toward parallel balanced growth paths. Furthermore, the convergence is rapid on average, even though the
estimated convergence rates are widely dispersed across the states and quite imprecisely estimated for each
individual state.”
10Allowing agents to move across regions in a dynamic general equilibrium setting could lead to very
complicated dynamics, which are diﬃcult to calibrate numerically. Among others, see Berliant and Kung
(2009).
11The literature is too large to be reviewed here. Among others, see Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin
(2010) and Woodford (2010) for a survey of the literature.
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3 discusses solution method and calibration issues. Numerical results are presented in Section
4. The last section concludes.
2 The model
This section presents a closed economy model with two regions, called region 1 and region 2.
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. There are several agents in this model economy.
In each region, there is a representative household which provides labor services and consumes
non-durable goods as well as housing services in each period. The population of region i is ni,
i = 1, 2, and is assumed to be fixed. Without loss of generality, we assume that n2 = 1−n1,
and sometimes write n1 = n to ease the burden of notations. The consumption goods are
a constant elasticity of substitution composite of goods from the two regions. Goods from
the two regions are in turn composite of many diﬀerentiated products, each provided by
a monopolistically competitive firm. Each firm hires labor and rents the business capital
from the representative household, and combines them to produce goods. The consolidated
government conducts monetary policy using a Taylor-style interest rate feedback rule.
The adjustments of prices are staggered à la Calvo (1983). In order to facilitate com-
parison with the recent literature, we focus on the Woodford (2003) case of a “cashless”
economy.12 We also assume that the government always balances the budget by making
lump sum transfer, so that there is no fiscal policy consideration. Unless otherwise specified,
the two regions are assumed to be symmetric, sharing the same structural parameters. To
simplify the exposition, we will focus on the description of region 1. Region 2 variables will
be denoted by asterisks.
12As explained in Woodford (2003), the “cashless” economy is similar to a setup where money demand
is introduced by adding a real money balance term in the utility that is separable from consumption and
leisure.
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2.1 Final goods production
Each region is assumed to produce a final good that is not traded across regions. The
production function for final goods in region 1, Zt, is:
Zt =
h
(')
1
( (Q1,t)
(−1
( + (1−')
1
( (Q2,t)
(−1
(
i (
(−1
, (1)
where Q1,t and Q2,t are goods from region 1 and region 2, respectively. By the same token,
there is another production function for final goods in region 2, Z∗t ,
Z∗t =
h
('∗)
1
(
¡
Q∗1,t
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( + (1−'∗)
1
(
¡
Q∗2,t
¢ (−1
(
i (
(−1
, (2)
where Q∗1,t and Q∗2,t are goods from region 1 and region 2, respectively. The parameter ' ∈
(0, 1) determines the share of Q1,t in the final goods of region 1 in the steady state. To allow
for home-biasedness in the regional composition of final goods, the corresponding parameter
for the final goods of region 2 will be denoted by '∗, with '∗ potentially diﬀerent from '.13
To ensure that (1) and (2) are symmetric, we need the condition that ' = (1−'∗) . In
addition, the home-biasedness in the composition of final goods implies that ' > 0.5 > '∗.
( > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between Q1,t and Q2,t. The goods Q1,t and Q2,t are a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation of intermediate goods from region 1 and region 2, respectively:
Q1,t =
"µ
1
n
¶ 1
ηy
Z n
0
(Q1,t (i))
ηy−1
ηy di
# ηy
ηy−1
, (3)
Q2,t =
"µ
1
1− n
¶ 1
ηy
Z 1
1−n
(Q2,t (i))
ηy−1
ηy di
# ηy
ηy−1
, (4)
13Clearly, it is beyond the scope to review the literature on “home-biasedness” in this paper. Among
others, see Tesar (1993), Tesar and Werner (1995), Baxter, Jermann and King (1998), Jermann (2002).
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where Q1,t (i) and Q2,t (i) are brand i goods from regions 1 and 2, respectively. Implicitly, we
have assumed that the measure of diﬀerentiated product brands in each region is proportional
to the corresponding population size. Thus, when n −→ 1, the current two-region model
will collapse into a typical closed economy macroeconomic model. ηy > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution across diﬀerent varieties of goods. Cost minimization implies the following
demand functions:
Q1,t (i) =
1
n
µ
P 1,t(i)
P 1,t
¶−ηy
Q1,t, (5)
Q2,t (i) =
1
1− n
µ
P 2,t(i)
P 2,t
¶−ηy
Q2,t, (6)
Q1,t = '
µ
P 1,t
P t
¶−(
Zt, (7)
Q2,t = (1−')
µ
P 2,t
P t
¶−(
Zt, (8)
where P 1,t(i), P 2,t(i), are (nominal) prices of brand i goods from regions 1 and 2 that will
be used to produce final goods in region 1 respectively, and P t is the general price level in
region 1. Formally, P 1,t, P 2,t and P t are defined as follows:
P 1,t ≡
∙
1
n
Z n
0
(P 1,t (i))
1−ηy di
¸ 1
1−ηy
, (9)
P 2,t ≡
∙
1
1− n
Z 1
1−n
(P 2,t (i))
1−ηy di
¸ 1
1−ηy
, (10)
P t ≡
£
' (P 1,t)
1−( + (1−') (P 2,t)1−(
¤ 1
1−( . (11)
Gross price inflation rate in region 1 can be defined as Πt ≡ P t/P t−1.
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2.2 Intermediate goods firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms in region 1, indexed by i ∈ [0, n].
Firm i’s production technology is given by:
At(Kt(i))θ(Lt(i))1−θ,
where Kt(i) and Lt(i) are respectively the amounts of capital and labor input used by firm
i. θ ≥ 0 is the share of capital. At is the aggregate technology process for region 1, which
evolves according to the law of motion:
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + εAt , (12)
where ρA ∈ (0, 1) is the first order autoregressive parameter and εAt is an i.i.d. shock with
standard deviation, σεA. There is a parallel structure in the region 2. The firms there are
subjected to another technology shock A∗t , following a law of motion similar to (12). For
simplicity and as a preliminary step in introducing regional considerations in a DSGE model,
we assume that the two region shocks are independent. The existence of these region-specific
shocks has been found to be very important, especially to the housing market.14
The demand for intermediate goods i, Yt(i) comes from regions 1 and 2:
Yt(i) = Q1,t (i) +Q∗1,t (i) ,
=
1
n
µ
P 1,t(i)
P 1,t
¶−ηy
Yt, (13)
where Yt is given by:
Yt = Q1,t +Q∗1,t. (14)
14The empirical literature on national versus regional shock is too large to be reviewed here. Among
others, see Fu (2007) for some recent results and a review of the literature.
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Y ∗t is defined similarly, Y ∗t = Q2,t +Q∗2,t. Since the steady state relative price of the output
in the two regions is unity, the real national GDP is simply the sum of the output in the two
regions, Yt + Y ∗t .
Firm i chooses Kt(i), and Lt(i) by minimizing the cost of production subject to the
constraint that the supply is able to meet the demand, Yt(i):
minRktKt(i) +W tLt(i) (15)
s.t. At(Kt(i))θ(Lt(i))1−θ ≥ Yt(i), (16)
where Rkt and W t are nominal rental rate for capital and nominal wage rate, respectively.
The first order conditions are:
Rkt = θMCtAt(Kt(i))
θ−1(Lt(i))1−θ, (17)
W t = (1− θ)MCtAt(Kt(i))θ(Lt(i))−θ, (18)
where MCt denotes the Lagrangian multiplier associated with equation (16), and can be
interpreted as the marginal cost.15
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in each period, each firm has a random proba-
bility (1 − αy), αy ∈ (0, 1) of resetting its nominal price, P 1,t(i). If P 1,t(i) is not reset, it
is updated by the steady state regional general price inflation rate, Π (which is the steady
state value of Πt), according to the rule P 1,t(i) = ΠP 1,t−1(i). Let P˜ 1,t denote the new price
that is reset in period t. After setting the price at period t, there is ατy probability that the
nominal price has not been reset at period t+ τ , and hence P 1,t+τ(i) = Πτ P˜ 1,t. Making use
of the price updating rule and the demand equation, (13), the price optimization problem
for firm i is:
15Given the structure of the model, marginal cost is equalized across firms, so there is no index i on MCt.
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max
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Πτ P˜ 1,t
P 1,t
!−ηy
Yt+τ − TC
Ã
1
n
Ã
Πτ P˜ 1,t
P 1,t
!−ηy
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, (19)
where ρt,t+τ is a discount factor for profit.16 TC(·) is the total cost as a function of output.
The first order condition is:
P˜ 1,t =
ηy
ηy − 1
Et
P∞
τ=0 (αyΠ
−ηy)
τ ρt,t+τ
P t+τ
MCt+τP
ηy
1,t+τYt+τ
Et
P∞
τ=0
¡
αyΠ1−ηy
¢τ ρt,t+τ
P t+τ
P
ηy
1,t+τYt+τ
. (20)
While the formula may look complicated, the intuition is very simple. When a firm is
oﬀered an opportunity to optimally adjust the price, it will take into consideration that
it may need to wait one period, or two periods, or three periods, and so on, with diﬀerent
probabilities attached to each possibility, before it can re-optimize the price again. Therefore,
the firm needs to take into considerations all these diﬀerent possibilities and sets a price at
the current period which would maximize the expectation of the discounted profit.
2.3 Household
There is a representative household in each region. The representative household maximizes
expected lifetime utility with period utility defined over consumption, Ct, labor hours, Lt and
housing service. To facilitate comparison with the previous literature, we follow Greenwood
and Hercowitz (1991) to assume that the housing service in each period is proportional to
the housing stock, Ht. The periodic utility function u(Ct,Ht, Lt) is specified as separable in
the three arguments:
E0
∞X
t=0
βtu(Ct,Ht, Lt), (21)
16ρt,t+τ = β
τ (Λt+τPt+τ ) / (ΛtPt) in equilibrium, where Λt is given in equation (27).
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u(Ct, Ht, Lt) =
C1−σt − 1
1− σ + γh
H1−ωht − 1
1− ωh
− γl
L1+ξt
1 + ξ
, (22)
where Et is the expectations operator conditional on period t information, β ∈ (0, 1) is
the subjective discount factor, σ, ωh > 0 are the coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion for
consumption and housing services, respectively, ξ ≥ 0 is the inverse of Frisch labor supply
elasticity, and γl, γh > 0 are preference parameters. When σ = ωh = ξ = 1, the periodic
utility function will be reduced to a “semi-log” form,17
u(Ct,Ht, Lt) = lnCt + γh lnHt − (γl/2) (Lt)2 . (23)
The representative household owns business capital, Kt, and housing stock, Ht, which
evolve according to the laws of motion:
Kt+1 = (1− δk)Kt + Ik,t −
φk
2
(Kt+1 −Kt)2
Kt
, (24)
Ht+1 = (1− δh) (Ht +Hmt ) + Ih,t −
φh
2
(Ht+1 − (Ht +Hmt ))
2
Ht +Hmt
, (25)
where Ik,t and Ih,t are the gross capital and housing investments, respectively. Hmt is the
amount of housing stock directly purchased from the market. φk
2
(Kt+1−Kt)2
Kt
and φh
2
(Ht+1−(Ht+Hmt ))
2
Ht+Hmt
,
with φk, φh > 0, are quadratic capital adjustment costs. We assume that the housing ad-
justment cost parameter for region 2, φ∗h, might diﬀer from that of region 1. δk, δh ∈ (0, 1)
are the depreciation rates of capital and housing stock.
The period-by-period budget constraint (in nominal terms) of the representative house-
17Clearly, log utility has been widely used in the literature. Setting ξ = 1 is not uncommon in the literature.
Among others, see Christiano et al. (2005).
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hold is given by:
Bt+1 +P t (Ct + Ik,t + Ih,t) +P htH
m
t +P
s
tSt+1
+
φb
2
Ã
Bt+1
P 1t
Yt
n
− b
!2
P 1t
Yt
n
+
φs
2
(St+1 − S)2
= Rt−1Bt +P st (St +Dt) +W tLt +R
k
tKt, (26)
where Bt+1 is a riskless one-period nominal bond, bought in period t and maturing in period
t+ 1; P ht is the nominal housing price. Rt is the gross nominal interest rate on the riskless
bond. To facilitate comparison with the previous literature, we focus on the interactions
between asset prices and the monetary policy at the aggregate level, and not the individual
firm level. Specifically, we assume that there is a mutual fund that owns all the firms in whole
economy. St+1 (S∗t ) is the amount of mutual fund bought by the representative household
in region 1 (2). P st is the nominal price of a unit of the stock of the mutual fund. Dt is the
dividend paid by the mutual fund, whose determination will be explained later. The term
φb
2
µ
Bt+1
P 1t
Yt
n
− b
¶2
P 1t
Yt
n and
φs
2
(St+1 − S)2 are (quadratic) adjustment cost for bond holding
and stock holding respectively. These are simple device to capture the idea of transaction
cost in financial market trading.
Substituting Ik,t and Ih,t from equations (24) and (25) into the budget constraint (26),
the representative household’s optimization problem consists of choosing Ct, Bt+1, Lt, Kt+1,
Ht+1, Hmt and St+1 to maximize the intertemporal utility, (21), subject to the budget con-
straint (26). The first order conditions with respect to Ct, Bt, Lt, Kt+1, Ht+1, Hmt and St+1
are:
1
Cσt
= ΛtP t, (27)
Λt
Ã
1 + φb
Ã
Bt+1
P 1t
Yt
n
− b
!!
= βEtΛt+1Rt, (28)
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γlL
ξ
t = ΛtWt, (29)
βEtΛt+1Rkt+1 + βEtΛt+1P t+1
"
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+
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#
= ΛtP t
µ
1 + φk
Kt+1 −Kt
Kt
¶
, (30)
γhβEt
1
Hωht+1
+ βEtΛt+1P t+1
"
(1− δh) + φh
Ht+2 −Ht+1
Ht+1
+
φh
2
(Ht+2 −Ht+1)2
H2t+1
#
= ΛtP t
µ
1 + φh
Ht+1 −Ht
Ht
¶
, (31)
P ht = P t
"
(1− δh) + φh
(Ht+1 − (Ht +Hmt ))
Ht +Hmt
+
φh
2
(Ht+1 − (Ht +Hmt ))
2
(Ht +Hmt )
2
#
, (32)
Λt (P st + φs (St+1 − S)) = βEt
£
Λt+1
¡
P st+1 +Dt+1
¢¤
(33)
where Λt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint, (26). Equa-
tion (27) relates Λt to the marginal utility of consumption. Equation (28) is the bond
Euler equation. Equation (29) equates the marginal benefit and cost of labor hour. Equa-
tions (30) and (30) are the Euler equations for physical capital and housing stock, respec-
tively. Equations (31) and (33) are the pricing equations for housing and stock, respectively.
If the portfolio adjustment cost is zero, φs = 0, and imposing the no bubble condition
limj→∞Et
hP∞
j=0 β
jΛt+jP st+j
i
= 0, then (33) is reduced to the familiar asset price equation,
which states that the stock price is the discounted value of all future dividend weighted by
the pricing kernel βj Λt+jΛt and in expected value terms,
P st = Et
" ∞X
j=0
βj
Λt+j
Λt
(Dt+j)
#
. (34)
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Thus, (33) can be interpreted as a generalization of (34).
2.4 Market clearing and aggregation
The market clearing conditions are standard and we simply extend their formulation in a
multi-regional setting here. First, the total net supply of bonds is zero in equilibrium:
nBt + (1− n)B∗t = 0. (35)
The households from the two regions hold all the equity in equilibrium:
nSt + (1− n)S∗t = 1. (36)
There is also no net trade in housing stock in each region:
Hmt = 0. (37)
The total demand of business capital and labor inputs across all firms must equal their
supply: Z n
0
Kt(i)di = nKt, (38)Z n
0
Lt(i)di = nLt. (39)
The supply of final goods needs to equal its demand. The case for region 1 is as follows:
Zt = n
⎛
⎝Ct + Ik,t + Ih,t +
φb
2
Ã
Bt+1
P 1t
Yt
n
− b
!2
P 1t
Yt
n
+
φs
2
(St+1 − S)2
⎞
⎠ , (40)
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and there is an analogous one in the region 2. Making use of the three equilibrium conditions
above, and the equilibrium condition that the ratio of factor inputs is equalized across firms
because of the Cobb-Douglas production function, equations (17) to (18) can be aggregated
as:
Rkt = θMCtAt(Kt)
θ−1(Ldt )
1−θ, (41)
W t = (1− θ)MCtAt(Kt)θ(Ldt )−θ. (42)
The random probability of adjusting prices allows us to write their price index, equations
(9), as:
P 1,t = αy (ΠP 1,t−1)
1−ηy + (1− αy)
³
P˜ 1,t
´1−ηy
, (43)
In equilibrium, equation (16) holds with equality. Combining equations (13) and (16) and
aggregating the resulting equation across firms, we have:18
nAt(Kt)θ(Ldt )
1−θ = sy,tYt, (44)
where
sy,t ≡
Z 1
0
µ
P 1,t(i)
P 1,t
¶−ηy
di. (45)
As noted in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006, 2007) and Khan et al. (2003), sy,t is a
measure of the resource cost of price dispersion associated with the Calvo-style price setting,
and it can be shown that sy,t ≥ 1. Higher values of sy,t correspond to a higher resource cost
of price dispersion, as a given combination of total capital and labor inputs gives rise to a
smaller amount of aggregate output, Yt. Similar to the case of the price index, given the
18In the equation below, we have made use of the fact that ratio of factor inputs is identical across firms
in this model.
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random nature of price adjustments, sy,t can be written recursively as:
sy,t = αy
µ
Π
P 1,t−1
P 1,t
¶−ηy
sy,t−1 + (1− αy)
Ã
P˜ t
P 1,t
!−ηy
. (46)
Finally, it is assumed that all profits are distributed as dividend, so the nominal dividend
Dt equals:
Dt ≡
Z n
0
¡
P 1,t(i)Yt(i)−RktKt(i)−W tLt(i)
¢
di+
Z 1
1−n
¡
P 2,t(i)Y ∗t (i)−Rk∗t K∗t (i)−W ∗tL∗t (i)
¢
di.
(47)
2.5 Monetary policy
We assume that the consolidated government conducts monetary policy using a Taylor
(1993)-style feedback rule. We assume that the consolidated government reacts to aggre-
gate inflation rate, constructed from weighted average of region specific inflation rates, with
the weights being the population sizes of the regions, as well as to the GDP.
ln (Rt/R) = Γp (n ln (Πt/Π) + (1− n) ln (Π∗t/Π∗)) + Γy ln (GDPt/GDP ) + εRt , (48)
where GDPt is the current period national output, where GDP is the steady state national
output (all in real terms). Since the focus of this paper is on asset prices, we assume that
reaction coeﬃcients Γp = 1.5, Γy = 0.125, i.e. they take on the values that Taylor (1993)
finds to describe US economy rather well.19 εRt is an i.i.d shock, with a standard deviation
of σεR , that captures deviation from the Taylor rule and can be interpreted as a monetary
19Taylor (1993) reports a value of 0.5 on annualized GDP, which translate into a value of 0.125 on quarterly
GDP.
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policy shock.
3 Solution method and calibration
We solve the model by taking first-order Taylor approximations of the equations around
a deterministic steady state. As in most DSGE models, the model is calibrated to match
certain stylized facts of the US economy in a quarterly frequency. For the benchmark case,
we calibrate the model so that (1) region 1 and region 2 are symmetric, except for their
housing adjustment cost parameters, and (2) the two regions share some characteristics with
the aggregate US economy in the data. Since we assume that the two regions are symmetric,
the population size of region 1, n, is set to 0.5. The subjective discount factor, β, is set
to 0.99, as is commonly assumed in the literature. The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
for consumption σ, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for housing ωh, and the inverse
of Frisch labor elasticity ξ are all set to unity. In other words, the periodic utility function
reduces to a “semi-log” form. The preference parameter for labor in the utility function,
γl is calibrated so that households spend 20% of their time working in the steady state.
The preference parameter for housing in the utility function, γh is calibrated so that the
steady state ratio of housing investment to consumption is 0.074.20 Following the literature
of two-country model of international business cycles, the elasticities of substitution of goods
from regions 1 and 2 in the final goods, (, is set to 3. It is somewhat higher than the usual
figure of 1.5, as the elasticity of substitution of goods between regions should be higher than
among countries, due to a variety of reasons, including trade barriers, transportation cost,
etc.21 The shares of region 1’s goods in the final goods of the two regions in the steady state,
' and '∗ are calibrated so that there is “home-biasedness” in the (regional) production of
20This steady state ratio comes from Davis and Heathcote (2005), who report that residential investment
is 4.7% of GDP, while consumption is 63.8% of GDP on average.
21We also check the impulse responses and find that under this elasticity of substitution, the impulse
response functions are all reasonable and resemble to those in the literature.
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the final goods. Specifically, we assume that each region uses more of its own goods in the
production of the final goods. Note that this assumption is necessary in order that the price
inflation rates in the two regions are diﬀerent. We set ' = 1 − ψ(1 − n) and '∗ = ψn,
so that the share of goods from the other region in the final goods equals the product of
ψ ∈ [0, 1], and the size of the other region. The parameter ψ can be interpreted as the degree
of openness among the two regions. For ψ = 1, the share of goods from the other region in
the final goods equals the size of the other region. For ψ = 0, each region consumes only
goods from its own region. In the benchmark model, we will set ψ to 0.5, so that ' = 0.75
and '∗ = 0.25 respectively. The steady state bond to output ratio, b, is set to zero while
the steady state stock holding S is set to 1.
The share of capital in production, θ is set to 0.3, as is commonly assumed in the liter-
ature. The depreciation rates of capital and housing stock, δk and δh, are set to 0.014 and
0.004, respectively, following Davis and Heathcote (2005).22 The capital adjustment cost
parameter and the region 1’s housing adjustment cost parameter, φk and φh, are set so that
the standard deviations of capital investment and housing investment are approximately 4.4
and 5.4 times the standard deviation of output, respectively.23 Region 2’s capital adjustment
cost parameter, φ∗k, is the same as φk. Since we intend to investigate the eﬀects of asym-
metry in housing adjustment cost parameters, once we find φh, we set φ
∗
h = 10φh, so that
region 2 has higher housing adjustment cost than region 1. In practice, such diﬀerence in
adjustment costs can be due not only to physical or engineering reason (Saiz, 2010), but also
to political economy reason. For instance, the residents may vote to limit the number of new
permits and hence constrain how fast the city can “grow.” Residents can also vote for zoning,
which demands a minimum size for houses within the neighborhood. Clearly, it will limit
the number of housing units to be supplied in the market. In some cities, homeowners are
22Specifically, we convert the annual depreciation rates in Davis and Heathcote (2005) to quarterly values.
23This is to be consistent with the ratios of the standard deviations capital investment and housing
investment to the standard deviation of output in the data.
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required to collect signatures from others in the neighborhood in order to build an additional
structure on top of existing ones. Thus, the residents can collective limit the “new supply” of
housing units (for more details, see Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks, 2005a, b; Ortalo-Magne and
Prat, 2007; among others). Perhaps more importantly, Saiz (2010) finds that anti-growth
local land policies are more likely to arise in growing, land-constrained metropolitan areas.
Econometrically, Saiz (2010) finds that supply elasticities can be well-characterized as func-
tions of both physical and regulatory constraints. To maintain the model tractability and to
capture the eﬀect that some regions have higher supply elasticities than the others, we find
that (artificially) increase φ∗h (relative to φh) seems to be a convenient way in modeling and
hence enabling us to focus on the macroeconomic implications of such diﬀerences.
The elasticity of substitution across diﬀerent varieties of goods, ηy, is set to 7.66, so
that the steady state markup of prices over marginal cost is 15%, following Rotemberg and
Woodford (1998). The fraction of firms not setting price optimally each quarter, αy, is set to
0.75, following Canzoneri et al. (2005), which implies average price duration of 4 quarters.
Following the literature, we set the steady state gross inflation rate, π, to 1. Finally, we need
to set the persistence and standard deviation of the region-specific technology shocks, ρA and
σεA. We set them to 0.95 and 0.009, respectively, following the national estimate by Cho and
Cooley (1995). We do that for two reasons. First, we are not aware of systematic estimates
along this line. Second, we can compare our results easily with the literature. In particular, if
we put n to be arbitrarily close to unity, our model is reduced to the standard DSGE model.
This provides us an additional way to verify our model and computer program. The standard
deviation of monetary policy shock, σεR is set to 0.007. This is the standard deviation of the
residual when the Taylor rule (48) is fitted to the interest rate data. As a preliminary step,
we study an environment with constant volatility of housing price. Miller and Peng (2006)
find evidence of the time-varying volatility in only 17% of the 277 metropolitan areas (MSA),
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suggesting that empirically, the housing price volatility is relatively “stable.”24 Finally, the
adjustment cost parameters for bond and stock, φb and φs, are both set at a small value of
0.001.25 This is necessary to ensure the stationarity of the model, so that a bounded solution
to the model can be computed. Table 2 summarizes the benchmark parameterization.
(Table 2 about here)
4 Results
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the basic numerical results. Recall that the only ex-ante diﬀerence
between regions 1 and 2 is the housing adjustment costs. Thus, it is not surprising that the
aggregate volatility of the physical capital investment (relative to the output) is about the
same in both regions. On the other hand, the volatility of the housing investment in region 2
(relative to the regional output Y ∗t ) is much lower than the counterparts in the aggregate and
that in the region 1. The mirror image of this result can be found in the relative volatility of
the house price. In region 1, since the housing adjustment cost is much lower, the volatility
of the housing investment is about 5 times of the corresponding regional output Yt. At the
same time, the volatility of the house price is only 5% of the corresponding regional output.
In contrast, in region 2 where housing adjustment cost is higher, the volatility of housing
investment is only 2.5 times of the corresponding regional output, but the volatility of the
house price is 24% of the regional output. This is broadly consistent with the stylized facts
that we highlight in the introduction that heterogeneity in house price levels and volatilities
are related to housing supply elasticities.
24Moreover, they find that MSAs with higher prices tend to have higher housing price volatility.
25With φb and φs set at 0.001, a 1% deviation of bond and stock from their steady state value will incur
an adjustment cost of 0.00000005 unit of goods, which is very small.
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This model is also capable to produce other stylized facts, some of them have been
documented in Hwang and Quigley (2006). First, the correlation between the national house
price (P h,nationalt ) and the national GDP is high (0.64), the counterparts between the regional
house prices (P ht and P h∗t ) and the national GDP is much lower (0.51 for region 1 and 0.57
for region 2). Second, for regions 1 and 2, the correlations between the regional housing
price and the regional output (i.e. corr
¡
P ht , Yt
¢
and corr
¡
P h∗t , Y ∗t
¢
) are much higher than
that between the regional house price and the national GDP (i.e. corr
¡
P ht , GDPt
¢
and
corr
¡
P h∗t , GDPt
¢
). Third, the correlation between the house price in the high adjustment
cost region (region 2 in this paper) and that in the low adjustment cost region (region 1 in
this paper) is low (0.25). In addition, Table 4 reproduces the stylized fact that the stock
price is close to a unit-root process. It also shows that the serial correlation of the house
price in low adjustment cost region is lower. Notice that in region 1, the correlation between
the contemporary house price and the 4-quarters lag is only 0.88, while the counterpart in
region 2 is 0.95, which is much more persistent.
(Table 3, 4 about here)
Table 5 summarizes the correlations between the (national) stock price and diﬀerent
house prices. It is obvious that the correlation between the stock price and the regional
house prices in region 1 are very diﬀerent from those in region 2. The intuition is simple.
When the housing adjustment cost is low, the housing supply can quickly respond to shocks,
and hence the house price will be less correlated to the national output as well as the stock
price, which is the discounted sum of firm profit in expected value. In fact, Table 3 shows
that the correlation between region 1 house price and the national GDP is only 0.51, which
is smaller than the counterpart in region 2 (0.57). Correspondingly, Table 5 shows that the
correlation between the region 1 house price and the contemporary period stock price is
0.46, which is significantly lower than that in region 2 (0.65). An implication is that agents
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living in region 1 have higher incentives to purchase stock, as their (location-specific) housing
wealth is less correlated with the national stock price. In other words, the optimal portfolio
may be region-specific.
(Table 5 about here)
To gain more intuitions on how the model works, Figure 2 presents the impulse responses
of diﬀerent variables when the system is impacted by a 1% technology shock from region
1 (i.e., a one-time increase in εAt in region 1, the size of which is 1% of the steady state of
At),26 and Figure 3 presents the counterpart when the system is impacted by a 1% technology
shock from the region 2. The results are intuitive. When the productivity shock occurs in
the region 1, the physical capital investment in region 1 should increase to take advantage
of that temporary shock. The eﬀect is so strong that the capital investment in region 2
and the housing investment in region 1 actually decrease. Resources are reallocated across
regions as well as sectors, from the less productive ones to the more productive one. At the
same time, output in region 1 increases. As the output in region 1 continues to increase,
the house price in region 1 eventually increases as well. Such increase in the region 1 house
price obviously will stimulate even more housing investment in region 1. Notice that even
the region 2 house price increases. It is because agents in region 2 also share the benefit of
the positive shock from region 1 through the stock market, which increases more than the
national house price index in terms of percentage deviation from the steady state after the
shock. The housing investment in region 2, however, almost remains unchanged. The high
adjustment cost discourages the region 2 to increase their housing investment.
(Figure 2 about here)
26Note that the shock will lead to a temporary but persistent increase in At through the autoregressive
coeﬃcient ρA.
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When the temporary positive shock occurs in region 2, the physical capital investment
in region 2 increases while that in the region 1 decreases. This is simply the mirror image
of the previous case when the positive shock occurs in region 1. On the other hand, we
notice that the housing investment situation is slightly diﬀerent. While the region-specific
productivity shock leads to an increase in the housing investment in region 2, it also leads
to a decrease in the housing investment in region 1. This is because the adjustment cost
of housing in region 2 is much higher. Since the corresponding adjustment cost in region 1
is much lower, it is cost-eﬃcient to (temporarily) decrease the housing investment in region
1. In subsequent periods, as more output are produced and as agents in region 1 share the
benefits of productivity shock through the stock market, the housing investment in region 1
increases. Notice also that in terms of magnitudes, the response of house price in region 2
to a productivity shock from region 2 is greater than the response of house price in region
1 to a productivity shock from region 1. In contrast, the response of housing investment
in region 2 to a productivity shock from region 2 is smaller than the response of housing
investment in region 1 to a productivity shock from region 1. In sum, the model suggests
that, other things being equal, regions with lower adjustment costs will have more volatile
housing investments, and regions with higher adjustment costs will have more volatile house
prices.
(Figure 3 about here)
Lastly, we consider an additional exercise, which is a 1% (contractionary) monetary policy
shock (i.e., a one-time increase in εRt ). It pushes up the interest rate. As the Figure 4 shows,
it has a very short-lived impact on the physical capital investment and output. While the
magnitudes of the responses of physical investment and output diﬀer in regions 1 and 2,
the diﬀerences are very small quantitatively. This should not be surprising as Carlino and
Defina (1998, 1999, 2006) find that it is heterogeneity in industrial structure (such as the
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share of manufacturing industry, the share of small firms, etc.) that drives the regional
diﬀerences in output responses. On the other hand, Figure 4 clearly shows that the housing
investments and house prices behave very diﬀerently across regions. As region 2 has a much
higher adjustment cost in housing, its change in housing investment is very slow relative
to the region 1. As a result, the house price in region 2 displays more volatility. This
is consistent with the finding of Fratanoni and Schuh (2003) that regional housing market
display heterogeneous response to monetary policy. Hence, our model is consistent with the
findings in both Carlino and Defina (1998, 1999, 2006) concerning output responses, and
Fratanoni and Schuh (2003) concerning housing market responses, among other previous
empirical research.
(Figure 4 about here)
5 Concluding Remarks
There is a growing empirical literature on the regional diﬀerence as well as regional comove-
ment. Theoretical works are, however, relatively rare. This paper takes a preliminary step
in extending a typical DSGE model to incorporate regional considerations. The model is
calibrated to match the U.S. economy in several dimensions and numerical results are gen-
erated. First, our model is consistent with the stylized fact that with lower housing supply
elasticity, both the level and volatility of the house price will be higher. We are also able
to generate heterogeneous regional housing market responses to monetary shock though we
find that heterogeneity in housing supply elasticities alone is not enough to explain hetero-
geneous responses of regional output to monetary policy shock. Thus, we reproduce the
empirical findings for both Carlino and Defina (1998, 1999, 2006), and Fratanoni and Schuh
(2003). In a sense, we also confirm the observation that the housing market seems to be
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more vulnerable to monetary shocks compared to output.
Moreover, we find that diﬀerences between the national variable and its regional coun-
terpart can be very significant. For instance, while the national housing price is highly
correlated to the national GDP, the housing price in some region needs not be. While the
national housing price is highly persistent, the regional counterparts need not be. In general,
the correlation between the regional housing price and the regional output is stronger than
the counterpart between the regional housing price and the national GDP.
In terms of the asset prices, this model successfully reproduces the near-unit-root behavior
of the stock price. While the housing prices in both national and regional levels are also
positively and serially correlated, there are regional diﬀerences. This model predicts that
regions with lower housing adjustment costs would tend to have lower serial correlations.
This model also predicts that the regions with lower housing adjustment costs will display
much lower correlations with the national stock price, suggesting that the optimal portfolio
can be region-specific. While some of these results have been documented before, some are
awaiting further empirical confirmations. We hope that future empirical works will verify
the testable implications delivered in this paper.
This paper can be, and should be extended in other ways. For instance, for simplicity,
we have assumed that the regions are ex-ante identical except for the housing adjustment
cost. In practice, regions can diﬀer in many dimensions. For instance, growth management
or other forms of new supply restrictions seem to occur more frequently in areas with fast-
growing housing price and economic output. In addition, diﬀerent regions tend to specialize
in diﬀerent sectors, and hence will have diﬀerent volatility in income. For instance, some
regions may be more export-dependent, and hence are exposed to exchange rate risk, while
some tend to mainly serve customers within the same country. The output in some regions
may be more tied to some natural resources (such as oil or metal) or agricultural products.
Their income would be more volatile than those that are not. Future work should incorporate
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such asymmetries as well. The model has also assumed a representative agent in each
region. In practice, heterogeneity among agents, such as in the form of income inequality,
is important. The heterogeneity among agents may also call for very diﬀerent policies in
a political economy context. This will significantly enrich the current framework. Open
economy considerations such as the foreign capital flow or regional trade exposure should
also be explored.
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Table 1
Price elasticity of housing supply and volatility of real house price
Metropolitan areas Supply Std. dev. of real
elasticity house price (%)
Miami 0.60 12.66
Los Angeles-Long Beach 0.63 11.45
San Francisco 0.66 6.51
San Diego 0.67 10.54
New York 0.76 6.20
Chicago 0.81 5.48
Boston-Worcester-Lawrence-Lowell-Brockton 0.86 4.81
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett 0.88 10.49
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria 1.02 2.66
Portland-Vancouver 1.07 6.47
Detroit 1.24 5.64
Minneapolis-St. Paul 1.45 6.27
Denver 1.53 3.19
Atlanta 2.55 3.39
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Table 2
Benchmark parameter values
Parameter Description Value
n Size of region 1 0.5
β Subjective discount factor 0.99
σ Coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion 1
ωh Coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for housing 1
ξ Inverse of Frisch labor elasticity 1
( Elasticity of substitution between goods from regions 1 and 2 3
' Share of region 1’s goods in region 1’s final goods 0.75
'∗ Share of region 1’s goods in region 2’s final goods 0.25
θ Capital share 0.3
δk Depreciation rate of capital 0.0557/4
δh Depreciation rate of housing 0.0157/4
φk Capital adjustment cost 0
φh Housing adjustment cost for region 1 2.5
φ∗h Housing adjustment cost for region 2 25
ηy Elasticity of substitution across diﬀerent variety of goods 7.66
αy Fraction of firms not setting price optimally each quarter 0.75
φb Bond adjustment cost parameter 0.001
φs Stock adjustment cost parameter 0.001
π Steady state gross inflation rate 1
ρA Persistence of technology process for region 1 0.95
ρA∗ Persistence of technology process for region 2 0.95
σεA Standard deviation of technology shock for region 1 0.009
σεA∗ Standard deviation of technology shock for region 2 0.009
σεR Standard deviation of monetary policy shock 0.007
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Table 3
Relative volatility of some national and regional variables and their correlations with the
GDP
Macro-variables
Relative Volatility
Std(Ik,nationalt )/Std(GDPt) 4.38
Std(Ikt )/Std(Yt) 4.40
Std(Ik∗t )/Std(Y ∗t ) 4.24
Std(Ih,nationalt )/Std(GDPt) 4.17
Std(Iht )/Std(Yt) 5.17
Std(Ih∗t )/Std(Y ∗t ) 2.46
Macro-Asset
Price Relationship
Std(P st )/Std(GDPt) 0.58
Std(P h,nationalt )/Std(GDPt) 0.17
Std(P ht )/Std(Yt) 0.05
Std(P h∗t )/Std(Y ∗t ) 0.24
Macro-Asset
Co-movement
corr(P st , GDPt) 0.80
corr
³
P h,nationalt , GDPt
´
0.64
corr
¡
P ht , GDPt
¢
0.51
corr
¡
P ht , Yt
¢
0.69
corr
¡
P h∗t , GDPt
¢
0.57
corr
¡
P h∗t , Y ∗t
¢
0.79
corr
¡
P ht , P h∗t
¢
0.25
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Table 4
Serial correlation of diﬀerent asset prices
Stock Price
corr
¡
P st , P st−1
¢
0.99
corr
¡
P st , P st−2
¢
0.97
corr
¡
P st , P st−3
¢
0.95
corr
¡
P st , P st−4
¢
0.94
House Price
corr
³
P h,nationalt , P
h,national
t−1
´
0.99
corr
³
P h,nationalt , P
h,national
t−2
´
0.98
corr
³
P h,nationalt , P
h,national
t−3
´
0.97
corr
³
P h,nationalt , P
h,national
t−4
´
0.95
corr
¡
P ht , P ht−1
¢
0.98
corr
¡
P ht , P ht−2
¢
0.95
corr
¡
P ht , P ht−3
¢
0.92
corr
¡
P ht , P ht−4
¢
0.88
corr
¡
P h∗t , P h∗t−1
¢
0.99
corr
¡
P h∗t , P h∗t−2
¢
0.98
corr
¡
P h∗t , P h∗t−3
¢
0.97
corr
¡
P h∗t , P h∗t−4
¢
0.95
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Table 5
Correlation between the stock price and diﬀerent housing prices
corr
³
P st , P
h,national
t−j
´
corr
¡
P st , P ht−j
¢
corr
¡
P st , P h∗t−j
¢
(contemporary)
j = 0 0.70 0.46 0.65
(lagged house prices)
j = 1 0.69 0.45 0.64
j = 2 0.68 0.44 0.64
j = 3 0.67 0.44 0.63
j = 4 0.66 0.43 0.62
(subsequent house prices)
j = −1 0.70 0.48 0.65
j = −2 0.69 0.49 0.64
j = −3 0.68 0.49 0.62
j = −4 0.66 0.48 0.61
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Figure 1: Supply elasticity versus standard deviation of real house price in 14 US
metropolitan areas
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Figure 2: Impulse response to technology shock from region 1
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Figure 3: Impulse response to technology shock from region 2
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Figure 4: Impulse response to contractionary monetary policy shock
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